As reported by Law360, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will allow argument after the January decision by the Commonwealth Court in Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 108 A.3d 140, 45 ELR 20006, in order to determine how judges should approach government actions challenged under the Environmental Rights Amendment (Article I, Section 27) of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court said that it would consider “the proper standards for judicial review of government actions and legislation challenged under the Environmental Rights Amendment” and, specifically, the constitutionality of a pair of fiscal code amendments that gave the Pennsylvania Legislature control over revenue streams generated from the leasing of state land for oil and gas drilling. In January, the Commonwealth Court ruled that the Environmental Rights Amendment did not place fundamental restrictions on what the Commonwealth can do with revenues generated from public lands.
Babst Calland represents an oil and gas operator in Lycoming County, PA, where a recent court order requires an objector to a well pad to post a $5.69 million bond in order to move forward with a land use appeal. The basic facts of the case are described below. Inflection Energy (PA) LLC (Inflection) is an oil and gas operator that received conditional use approval for a well site in Loyalsock Township’s Agricultural Rural (A-R) zoning district. An objector appealed that approval to the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County. The appeal contained no allegations that Inflection failed to meet any of the objective requirements of the Loyalsock Township Zoning Ordinance. In response to that appeal, Inflection filed a petition for bond with the Court alleging that the primary purpose of the appeal was for delay, that the appeal was frivolous on the merits, and that the objector should post a bond to compensate Inflection for that delay if the objector chooses to move forward with the appeal. At the hearing before Senior Judge Brendan J. Vanston, Inflection presented as witnesses two Inflection employees who testified that the objector had stated that the appeal was brought only to delay the development of the well pad. On November 6, 2015, Sr. Judge Vanston entered an Order of Court finding that the appeal was frivolous and that the objector shall post a bond with the Court in the amount of $5.69 million by December 4, 2015 in order to proceed with the appeal.
In Chesapeake Exploration v. Buell, the Ohio Supreme Court held that oil and gas leases constitute “title transactions” under Ohio’s Dormant Mineral Act (“DMA”). Under the DMA a “title transaction” constitutes a saving event to preclude severed mineral rights from being deemed abandoned and reunited with rights to the corresponding surface property. Of critical importance is whether an oil and gas lease constitutes a “title transaction” under the law. While the DMA defines the term “title transaction” it did not state whether an oil and gas lease constitutes a title transaction. The Court concluded that a “title transaction” is any transaction affecting title to any interest in land and that oil and gas leases affected title to land.
On October 21, 2015, Judge Richard McCormick, President Judge of the Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas, issued a decision and order upholding the validity of Allegheny Township’s zoning ordinance, which permits oil and gas well development in the Township’s R2 Agricultural/Residential Zoning District. The decision in Frederick v. Allegheny Township Zoning Hearing Board, No. 1898 of 2015 (Com. Pl. Westmoreland Co. Oct. 21, 2015), affirms a previous decision of the Township’s Zoning Hearing Board. Babst Calland represented CNX Gas Company LLC (CNX), an intervenor in the case, before both the Common Pleas Court and the Zoning Hearing Board.
CNX applied for and received a zoning compliance permit to develop an unconventional gas well pad in the Township’s R2 District, in which oil and gas well development is permitted as a use by right. Neighboring property owners Dolores Frederick, Beverly Taylor, and Patricia Hagaman appealed to the Zoning Hearing Board, challenging both the issuance of the permit and the validity of the Township’s zoning ordinance, alleging that permitting oil and gas well development in the R2 District violated the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Following several nights of hearings and oral argument, the Zoning Hearing Board ruled that the zoning ordinance was valid and upheld the issuance of the zoning compliance permit. Objectors then appealed to Common Pleas Court.
Since the Robinson decision, zoning ordinances authorizing oil and gas development have been challenged in several municipalities, with objectors essentially arguing that those ordinances are invalid because they are not strict enough. In most of these cases, the objectors have asserted that the zoning ordinance violated the Pennsylvania Environmental Rights Amendment (as interpreted by the Robinson plurality) because it permitted oil and gas development, a use they characterize as “industrial”, in agricultural, residential and other non-industrial districts. To date, all of those challenges have been rejected by local zoning hearing boards, although several of those decisions have been appealed to Common Pleas Court. Frederick is significant in that it is the first case in which a Court has addressed a Robinson based ordinance validity challenge. This case is precedential in Westmoreland County and is instructive to Courts in the other counties of the Commonwealth.
In Frederick, Judge McCormick first observed that Robinson was not binding precedent because it was only a plurality decision. The Court also pointed out that that Robinson did not address the constitutionality of a local ordinance, but instead involved a statute of statewide application (Act 13) that was invalidated because it interfered with the right of municipalities to make local zoning determinations. In any event, the Court went on to conclude that the Allegheny Township zoning ordinance was consistent with the Robinson plurality. Significantly, citing the extensive record developed before the Zoning Hearing Board, Judge McCormick expressly rejected the objectors’ contention that the zoning ordinance’s authorization of oil and gas uses “is inconsistent with the agricultural and residential character of the Township.” That record established that (1) there was a long history of oil and gas development in the Township, including a number of wells and a pipeline in close proximity of the objectors’ properties, (2) in the R2 District approximately 75% of the land mass is leased to oil and gas operators, (3) having the well pad on his property enabled the surface owner to continue actively farming his property instead of developing it for a residential subdivision, and (4) permitting oil and gas operations in the R2 District enhances the Township’s ability to maintain its rural character. The Court also cited to expert testimony which concluded that oil and gas operations have safely coexisted within rural communities throughout the Commonwealth.
Judge McCormick also rejected several of the objectors’ related arguments. Specifically, the Court ruled that the Township zoning ordinance did not constitute illegal “spot” zoning and did not violate sections 604 and 605 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code. In so concluding, the Court stated that the Township’s “legislative body sought to further the general welfare of its citizens by permitting them to benefit economically from oil and gas resources and royalites, and enabling them to retain the agricultural use and rural setting of their land.” Finally, the Court found that the authorization of oil and gas development did not violate the community development objectives of the Township zoning ordinance.
On October 14, 2015, the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania invalidated several provisions of a Grant Township, Indiana County, Pennsylvania local ordinance that was intended to prevent an oil and gas operator from operating an injection well that had been permitted by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. In Pennsylvania General Energy Company, L.L.C. v. Grant Township, C.A. No. 14-209, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139921 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2015), Pennsylvania General Energy Company, L.L.C. challenged the constitutionality, validity and enforceability of the Grant Township ordinance that sought to establish a self-described Community Bill of Rights Ordinance. For additional information, read our recent Administrative Watch.
On August 26, 2015, seven environmental groups sent the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) a Notice of Intent to Sue the agency in an attempt to force the agency to develop tailored rules for oil and gas wastes under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Subtitle D solid waste program. The groups argued that the agency has not within the statutorily required three-year timeframe (1) reviewed and, where necessary, revised RCRA’s Subtitle D solid waste regulations for oil and gas wastes, and (2) reviewed and/or revised its guidelines for state solid waste management plans for oil and gas wastes. For additional information, read our recent Administrative Watch.
The Medina County Court of Common Pleas issued a decision allowing surveys to be completed on tracts of land along the proposed NEXUS pipeline route. In Nexus Gas Transmission, LLC v. Houston, the Court ruled that the plain language of Chapter 163 of the Ohio Revised Code provides a right to access private property for the purpose of taking surveys for the pipeline project. The ruling will allow the NEXUS pipeline owners to move ahead with obtaining approval for the project from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
Earlier today, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court issued a unanimous decision in the much-anticipated case of Gorsline v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfield Township, reversing the decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County. In reversing the lower court, the Commonwealth Court upheld Fairfield Township’s decision to grant conditional use approval to Inflection Energy, LLC for an unconventional well pad. This case is significant for several reasons. First, the Commonwealth Court made it clear that it is insufficient for objectors to sustain their burden by merely stating concerns or asking questions of the developer’s expert witnesses. Instead, they must present evidence to substantiate those concerns. Second, the Commonwealth Court criticized the lower court for making its own findings of fact when it did not take additional evidence and where the municipality made its own findings of fact. Third, the Commonwealth Court recognized that the lower court erred by focusing on truck deliveries during the construction phase of the project because zoning regulates the use of land and not the particulars of development and construction. Finally, the objectors attempted to raise issues based on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Robinson Township decision, arguing that natural gas development is an industrial use that is per se incompatible with a residential/agricultural zoning district and that approval of the natural gas development violated the Environmental Rights Amendment of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Commonwealth Court summarily rejected these two arguments and noted that, because the record supported the township’s determination that the proposed well pad was compatible with the permitted uses in the residential/agricultural district and the objectors presented no evidence of harm, the objectors’ claims were unsupported by the accepted evidence of record. This final point is especially significant because many anti-industry opponents cite both the lower court’s opinion and the Delaware Riverkeeper Network’s amicus brief from this case in other zoning proceedings as support for the now rejected view that oil and gas development must only occur in industrial zoning districts.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled on Friday that an oil and gas lease was not forfeited by the failure of the operators to pay delay rentals. In Dewing v. Abarta Oil & Gas Co., the landowners (the “Dewings”) executed an oil and gas lease that was owned by Abarta Oil & Gas Co. Inc., Talisman Energy USA, Inc. (“Talisman”) and Range Resources (“Range”, collectively, the “Operators”). The lease provided that delay rentals be paid for the primary term for the lease unless and until a well is drilled on the property or a well unit is drilled. The lease also stated that it “shall never be subject to a civil action or other proceeding to enforce a claim of forfeiture due to Lessee’s alleged failure to perform as specified herein, unless Lessee has received written notice of Lessor’s demand and thereafter fails or refuses to satisfy Lessor’s demand within 60 days from the receipt of the notice” (the “Forfeiture Clause”). The Dewings did not receive delay rentals for a period of time and sent notice of such failure to Talisman, which informed the Dewings that Range was handling the payment of delay rentals. The Dewings subsequently sent notice that the lease was forfeited to Range, and Range thereafter paid the delay rentals to the Dewings. The Dewings filed the underlying civil action, alleging that the lease had been forfeited and abandoned for failure to timely pay the delay rental. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling in favor of the Operators, stating that although the Dewings had the right to seek forfeiture under the Forfeiture Clause, they did not prove that the Operators did not materially breach the lease. Citing a prior decision, Linder v. SWEPI, 549 Fed. Apx. 104 (3d. Cir. 2013), the Superior Court held that unless a contract contains a “time-is-of-the-essence” clause, the breach of the delay rental provision by making a late payment is not a material breach. Further, when a lease includes a 60-day cure period, it is evident that the parties intended to improve the chances of an out-of-court resolution to a breach caused by the late payment of delay rentals. Therefore, the Superior Court held that the Operators had not materially breached or abandoned the oil and gas lease under dispute.
On August 14, 2015, the Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals issued a decision in Armstrong v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., deciding that the plaintiffs may not pursue an action seeking lease forfeiture based on the nonpayment of oil and natural gas royalties absent an explicit lease provision allowing them to do so. The plaintiffs alleged that Chesapeake failed to pay royalties owed on oil and natural gas production after the plaintiffs notified the company of their acquisition of the property from the former lessors. The court found, however, that absent a clause in the lease allowing the lessor to declare a forfeiture for the nonpayment of royalties, nonpayment merely gives rise to an action for damages and not cancellation.
In a unanimous decision, the Ohio Supreme Court held that under the 2006 Dormant Mineral Act (“DMA”), the filing of a claim to preserve a mineral interest from being deemed abandoned is sufficient to preserve the mineral interest if it was recorded within 60 days following the notice of abandonment. Under this guidance, even if there are no otherwise qualifying savings events during the 20-year period preceding the notice of abandonment, the mineral interest can still be preserved by claim the timely filing of the claim to preserve.
The Ohio Supreme Court specifically noted that the parties to the underlying lawsuit did not dispute whether 1989 or 2006 version of the DMA applied so the court applied the 2006 DMA, as amended. The issue of which version applies will be decided in Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. and Walker v. Shondrick-Nau, which are pending before the Court. Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. was argued to the Court on May 6, 2015 and Walker v. Shondrick-Nau is scheduled for oral argument on June 23, 2015.
In Hoop v. Kimble, the Seventh District Court of Appeals upheld a trial court ruling that forfeiture was not an appropriate remedy for the breach of an anti-assignment provision in an oil and gas lease. In the case, the original lessee of the lease died and left his entire estate, including the family business, to his wife. She in turn assigned the subject oil and gas lease to herself and then formed a new legal entity. The lease contained a “trade-sale clause” which provided that the lease shall not be traded or sold without the permission of the lessor.
The property owners sought forfeiture and cancellation of the lease and argued that the assignment of the lease breached the trade-sale clause. The trial court found that the trade-sale clause was breached by the assignment, but did not order forfeiture. The appeals’ court agreed and noted that forfeiture is an appropriate remedy only in certain, limited circumstances. To establish that forfeiture is appropriate the lease must specifically so provide and the legal damages resulting from the breach must be inadequate. Neither of these elements were present in the case, so the appeals court did not order forfeiture of the lease.
The Seventh District Court of Appeals has reaffirmed its prior decision in Hupp v. Beck Energy Corp. In Belmont Hills Country Club v. Beck Energy Corp. and Bentley v. Beck Energy Corp., the appeals court relied on Hupp in holding that a conditional secondary term does not make a lease perpetual in nature and that the lease at issue contained an express waiver of implied covenants of reasonable development. Further, a lease that allows production in paying quantities to be determined “in the judgment of the lessee” does not create a perpetual because courts impose a good faith standard on the paying quantities determination. The court also held that the delay rental provision did not allow the lease to be held in perpetuity by making nominal payments.
FuelFix.com reports that the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania recently ruled that the Constitution Pipeline can be built across seven northeastern Pennsylvania properties despite the fact that the respective landowners had not agreed to the construction. The Constitution Pipeline is a 124-mile pipeline project designed to transport Marcellus Shale gas from Pennsylvania to New York and New England. It would connect with the existing Tennessee and Iroquois pipelines in New York. Its partner companies, including Williams Partners LP and Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., sought access to 130 properties in Pennsylvania and filed condemnation proceedings regarding 20. Agreements were reached with 13 of the 20 landowners. Judge Malachy Mannion ruled that the pipeline has the necessary permits from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and that it serves the public interest by increasing gas pipeline capacity. Judge Mannion also noted that the landowners stood to gain adequate compensation from the pipeline’s owners. A spokesman for Williams stated that the group hopes to begin construction by June 1st after obtaining additional permits and posting the necessary bond.
In a recent non-precedential opinion, the Third Circuit affirmed a decision of the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing an action on the basis that a doctor lacked standing to challenge what he refers to as the “Medical Gag Rules” of Act 13. In Rodriguez v. Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, the plaintiff, a doctor specializing in the treatment of renal diseases, hypertension and advanced diabetes, asserted he is unable to obtain critical information about the quality of local water. Specifically, he claimed that he needed the information to properly diagnose and treat patients whose illnesses or medical conditions allegedly resulted from contact with environmental contaminants. He therefore challenged Section 3222.1 of Act 13, which provides two mechanisms for health professionals to learn proprietary information about the chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing—one for medical emergencies and one for non-emergency situations. Dr. Rodriguez argued Act 13’s non-emergency provision, which requires a written statement and the execution of a confidentiality agreement, impermissibly restricts his speech and is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
The Middle District of Pennsylvania held that Dr. Rodriguez’s alleged injury was too speculative to satisfy the requirements of standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. In this regard, Dr. Rodriguez did not allege that he had ever been in a situation where he needed or attempted to obtain such information, or that he had ever been forced to sign a confidentiality agreement under Act 13. In short, he never suffered an injury-in-fact.
On appeal, the Third Circuit agreed with the District Court, holding that it was insufficient for Dr. Rodriguez to rely on “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Rather, he must allege that he suffered an invasion of an interest that is actual or imminent, not conjectural. The Third Circuit also distinguished Dr. Rodriguez’s reliance upon the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s 2013 opinion in Robinson Twp., Washington Cty. v. Com. The court ruled that Dr. Rodriguez’s reliance on Pennsylvania law as authority regarding federal standing requirements was misplaced.