Pennsylvania Supreme Court Affirms Title Washing
On July 19, in Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller (Case No. 5 MAP 2015), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in a 5-0 decision to confirm the practice of “title washing” of unseated or unimproved land in Pennsylvania. Prior to January 1, 1948, “title washing” occurred through a tax sale of unseated land from which oil, gas and/or minerals (the “subsurface estate”) had been previously severed. If the subsurface estate had not been separately assessed, the tax sale of the unseated land would extinguish the prior severance and vest the tax sale purchaser with full ownership in the surface and subsurface estates. If the oil and gas had been separately assessed, then the tax sale of the surface would have no effect on the subsurface estate. After January 1, 1948, mineral estates were no longer separately assessed from the surface in Pennsylvania and title washing could no longer occur.
In Herder Spring, the Court held that a 1935 tax sale for unseated land which was subject to an unassessed 1899 subsurface severance conveyed both the surface and subsurface estates. Citing prior case law, the Court reasoned that, under the prior tax sale law, taxes on unseated land were against the land itself rather than any particular owner. The law placed a duty on the owner of a severed interest to notify the taxing authorities. Tax commissioners had no duty to search the deed records to discover severances relating to unimproved lands. Therefore, if the subsurface was never separately assessed, then the property would be assessed and taxed as a whole, and a tax sale thereunder would encompass the entire estate. Additionally, the Court pointed out that owners of the mineral estate had two years to challenge the tax sale or redeem the property, but failed to do so. The Court also rejected the Appellants’ due process and estoppel by deed argument.
The Court limited its holding in Herder Spring to a very narrow subset of cases and noted that its decision would not govern: (i) tax sales for assessments of surface or mineral rights only; (ii) tax sales where severances occurred after the tax assessment; or (iii) situations in which surface owners can meet the adverse possession standard.
Justice Todd filed a concurring opinion agreeing with the majority but for its position on Appellants’ due process claim that notice by publication of the tax sale was inadequate. According to Justice Todd, such claim was waived for purposes of this appeal because it was untimely raised.